Many electoral rules (such as those governing the U.S. Constitution) require a supermajority vote to change the status quo. It is well known that without some restriction on preferences, super-majority rules have paradoxical properties. For example, electoral cycles are possible with anything other than 100%-majority rule. Can these problems still arise if there is sufficient similarity of attitudes among the voting population?
If everyone has the same preferences, social decisions can be made unanimously. Arrow's suggestion requires a restriction of the distribution of preferences less extreme than unanimity.
We present a new approach to the theory of social choice combining suggestions of Condorcet and Arrow. The idea that preferences may be similar across society is formalized in a mathematical definition of social consensus. When this consensus exists, voting cycles are impossible under a 64%-majority rule.
Our results provide new evidence on the positive properties of super-majority rules. Such voting mechanisms are widely used in practice. The Constitutions of the U.S., twenty of the fifty states, and a wide variety of countries all require a two-thirds vote to approve an amendment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Our definition of social consensus is presented in Section 3. The theorems are stated and proved in Section 4 with extensions provided in Section 5. In Section 6, we show how our results are related to Condorcet's original proposal. Section 7 discusses the design of a voting constitution based on a super-majority voting rule. Concluding remarks are in Section 8.
MAJORITY RULE AND ITS GENERALIZATIONS
Two different directions have been taken to resolve Condorcet's paradox of voting. One approach is to find conditions which rule out voting cycles even under simple (50%) majority rule. This literature begins with Black's (1948a) work on the median voter. A second approach, also due to Black (1948b) , is to consider properties of super-majority rules. The applicability of each approach is considered in turn. Black (1948a) demonstrates that voting cycles cannot arise when preferences satisfy a "single-peakedness" condition. There are two requirements for singlepeakedness: the social decision must be one-dimensional and voters' utility functions must be unimodal in this dimension. Individuals can then be identified by their most preferred position. The median voter's optimum secures a majority over all alternatives.
The one-dimensional nature of the median voter result is problematic. It imposes strong restrictions on individuals preferences. The restrictions can be illustrated using the political parties in the United Kingdom. If we place the Labour party (L) on the left, the SDP/Liberal Alliance (A) in the center, and the Conservatives (C) on the right, single-peakedness rules out (L >-C >-A) and (C >-L >-A). In reality, other dimensions such as experience in office are important. As a result, these preferences can no longer be ruled out and singlepeakedness fails.
Multi-dimensional analogues of the median voter result are offered by Davis et al. (1972) , Grandmont (1978) , Plott (1967) , and Tullock (1967) . A multidimensional median is created by imposing symmetry conditions. For example, when the distribution of most preferred points is radially symmetric around a median voter, this voter's optimum will secure a majority over all alternatives.
These results show that extremely strong assumptions are needed to support simple majority rule. Weaker assumptions are possible if we consider the generalization to super-majority rules, also known as 8-majority rules (see Black (1948b) ). Under a 8-majority rule, priority is given to the status quo. Any alternative proposal must gain the support of more than 8 of the population to replace the status quo. A proposal which is unbeatable should it become the status quo is called a 8-majority winner. A 8-majority winner is then a proposal preferred by more than a fraction (1 -8) of the population to any other alternative in pairwise comparisons.
Condorcet's paradox demonstrates the possibility that there may be no 50%-majority winner. In fact, the works of Kramer (1973) , Plott (1967) , and Rubinstein (1979) show that this possibility is almost a certainty; the set of societies for which there exists a 50%-majority winner is of measure zero. It is then natural to investigate the minimal majority size which ensures the existence of a 8-majority winner. This is known as the Simpson-Kramer min-max majority (Simpson (1969) , Kramer (1977) ). This concept is central to our work and is now presented more formally.
There is a social decision to be made. The set of proposals among which society can choose is denoted by X. Elements of X are represented as vectors in n-dimensional Eucidean space, X C Rn. For a given element x e X, the k th coordinate, Xk, pinpoints the proposal's position on the kth issue, 1 < k < n. Individual preferences are defined over Rn. These preferences vary across society. The range of preferences is summarized by an index of types, I: an individual of type i has preferences >i. A given society can then be characterized by the distribution of types, described by the density function f(i) on i E I. Definition 1 summarizes this description of the social choice problem. DEFINITION 1: A social decision problem, C, is defined by the triple { X, >i, f(i)} with X c R , representing the choice set; >i representing type i 's preference ordering over R , i E I; and f(i) representing the density function over types in society.
The definition of the min-max majority closely follows Kramer (1977) and Rosenthal (1975) . The difference is that our definition allows for a continuum of voters. The social choice correspondence which associates with a decision problem C the corresponding min-max set is known as the min-max rule. An axiomatic characterization of this rule is provided by Blair (1979) .
A major result on the min-max majority is due to Greenberg (1979) : for decision problems C in Rn and individuals with convex preferences, m*(C) is bounded above by n/(n + 1). Lemma 1 in the Appendix provides a simple proof of this result for the case of Euclidean preferences. The problem of dividing a fixed pie among n + 1 selfish individuals illustrates Greenberg's bounds.3 Here, n of the n + 1 people prefer to expropriate the excluded individual's piece of the pie. Thus any proposed division can be outvoted by a majority of n/(n + 1). The need for such a large majority size reflects society's complete polarization.
The importance of these bounds is seen in the context of a voting rule.4 The voting rule specifies the majority size, 8, required to overturn the status quo. Once 8 is chosen, it will be applied to a wide variety of currently unknown decision problems. To avoid voting cycles, 8 must exceed the min-max majority. But Greenberg's result demonstrates that the only universal upper bound on the min-max majority is 1. Use of 8 = 1 means that unanimity is required to change the status quo: anybody can veto change.
The unanimity rule is needed when allowing for issues (such as pie division) which polarize voters. This brings us back to the suggestion of Arrow. We consider a restricted class of decisions for which there is a social consensus. Under these conditions, a 64%-majority rule winner always exists.
THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL CONSENSUS
We introduce a definition of social consensus which involves two restrictions on domain: one on individual preferences >i, the other on the distribution of preferences f(i). These conditions are taken up in reverse order. Assumption A2 is new to the social choice literature. Concavity requires a degree of consensus and thus ensures that society is not polarized. Its meaning is illustrated by an example. Consider the choice of a flat tax rate t, 0 < t < 1. Viewing this as a simple one-dimensional problem, Al implies that individuals rank tax rates according to their absolute difference from some most preferred rate. The assumption that f(t) is concave rules out a situation in which many people favor very low rates, many favor very high rates, but few favor intermediate rates. More precisely, concavity allows statements of the following kind: if at least 40% of the population favor 0 < t < 0.2 and at least 20% favor 0.4 < t < 0.6, then at least 30% favor 0.2 < t < 0.4.
ASSUMPTION Al (Eucidean Preferences
In a more subtle manner, A2 (concavity) also implies that no type i has positive measure.5 Theorem 3 demonstrates that the results extend to the limiting case of large finite populations drawn from the original concave density. In this sense, the concavity assumption can be applied to a large finite economy.
The restrictive nature of A2 is apparent. Restrictive though it may be, it cannot be relaxed in an obvious way. In Section 5, we consider the weaker requirement of quasi-concavity as an alternative to concavity as a definition of social consensus,
O< X <1 and (xI,x2)eS.
Proposition 6 exhibits quasi-concave densities which fail to satisfy any reasonable measure of consensus: in these examples, quasi-concavity has no power in bounding the min-max majority. However, our results do generalize to densities which are "close to" concave (e.g., the truncated normal). Proposition 5 provides this extension.
The applicability of A2 to a given social choice problem is an empirical question. Since it requires a degree of social consensus it may be implausible for decisions in which polarization is to be expected, such as the pie division problem. However, the assumption may be more realistic in cases when the underlying issues are not so clearly divisive. In a limited set of tests, data from political scientists suggest that A2 is applicable to Presidential elections. For example, Aldrich and McKelvey (1977) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984) provide spatial mappings of most preferred points for voters in the 1968 to 1980 elections which broadly support concavity. Assumption Al (Eucidean preferences) was introduced in Davis and Hinich (1967) and has since become common in the social choice literature. In one dimension, Al implies Black's condition of single-peakedness. This leads to a restriction on preferences, a value restriction, whenever there are three or more alternatives (Sen (1966) , Kramer (1973) ). Recalling the example of the U.K. political parties, the restriction on preferences over the three alternatives is removed in a two-dimensional setting. Proposition 1, proven in the Appendix, shows that as dimensionality increases, Al has less restrictive implications for preference orderings. The proposition highlights the role of dimensionality. When the choice set is of a low dimension, Al implies particularly strong a priori restrictions on preferences.7 On the other side, A2 (Concavity) becomes more restrictive as dimensionality increases. Thus, the choice of an appropriate dimensional setting for a given problem is itself a subtle issue. Fortunately, our central results can be stated without reference to dimensionality.
For our purposes, the essential property of Al is that supporters of distinct proposals are divided by a hyperplane in the space of most preferred points. Section 5 shows that our results generalize to any family of preferences with this property. Such families of preferences are called intermediate preferences (Grandmont (1978) ); this class includes the important case of constant elasticity of substitution utility functions.
We make one final assumption which simplifies our proofs. The choice set X is assumed to be compact and to contain the Pareto optimal set, S. Proposition 7 extends all results to the case where X is finite. ASSUMPTION A3 (Inclusivity): The set X of proposals is compact and contains the set S, the support of f (x).
RESULTS
We establish that the min-max majority is always less than 64%. There exists a proposal which at least 36% of the population favor against any alternative. For n-dimensional decision problems, Theorem 2 provides an upper bound on m*(C) of 1 -(n/(n + 1))". These bounds are the best available. The dimension-free 6 Provided that the m proposals span a space of dimension m -1. 7Another restrictive aspect of Al is the implied symmetry of individual preferences around the most preferred point. The generalization to intermediate preferences in Section 5 shows that this form of symmetry is not essential to our results. result arises from the fact that (n/(n + 1))" falls monotonically to l/e, which is just above 36%.
Before presenting the theorems, we provide a series of examples and preliminary results. The examples provide the intuition needed to motivate the theorems. The first significant step is then taken in Theorem 1 which establishes the bound for a restricted class of concave densities, uniform densities over convex sets in Rn. Theorem 2 next establishes the general bound. Finally, examples are provided showing the bounds to be tight.
Our first preliminary result is closely related to Hotelling's principle of minimal differentiation (1929). The best way to gather votes against a given proposal is to locate "next door," on the side with the largest population. PROOF: Pick points x interior to S, y e X, y = x, and consider proposals along the line segment joining y to x. Proposals along this segment closer to x get an ever larger share of the vote against x. This follows from the concavity of the Eucidean preferences: an individual who prefers y to x also prefers [Xy + (1 -X)x] to x, 0 < X < 1. Hence in looking for supy { m(x, y)}, we can restrict attention to points y E S arbitrarily close to x. In the limit, voters are divided by a hyperplane through x with normal y -x. Since x is an interior point of S, it can be approached from all directions so that the hyperplane through x which most unevenly divides the population defines m(x).
If x E X not interior to S, then since S is a convex set, there exists a hyperplane through x containing S in one of the half-spaces. This concurs with m(x) = 1; for x exterior to S the closest point in S is unanimously preferred, while for x on the boundary, points interior to S approaching x can capture the entire vote.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 greatly simplifies the interpretation of the min-max majority, m *(C). This majority can now be related to a cake-cutting problem. Two people must divide an asymmetric cake defined by the density function f(x). The second person both cuts the cake and chooses the side. But this cut is constrained to pass through a point of the first person's choosing. If the first person chooses the point x, then the second person playing optimally receives a fraction m(x) of the cake. The first person's objective is to find the point minimizing m(x). In equilibrium, the second person receives fraction m * (C), the min-max majority.
To understand the general results on m*(C), consider some simple 1-and 2-dimensional voting problems. Insights from these examples are central to understanding higher dimensional problems. Here, Proposition 2 is used to simplify the exposition; instead of proposals and counterproposals, we have points and hyperplanes.
With voters' most preferred points uniformly distributed along a line segment, [0,1], the min-max majority is 50%, as location at the mid-point leaves the set evenly divided. The fact that m *(C) = 1/2 is well known; it is a special case of Black's median voter result. In two dimensions, the simplest cases involve voters' most preferred points uniformly distributed over centrally symmetric figures. For a uniform density over a rectangle (Tullock (1967) ), the min-max majority is again 50% and the min-max point is at the center of the rectangle. However, the 50% min-max majority does not generalize to distributions that are not radially symmetric.
An example of an asymmetric density satisfying A2 is a uniform distribution of most preferred points over a triangle in the plane. In this case, no proposal can sustain a 50%-majority against all alternatives. In fact, Proposition 3 shows that the min-max majority is 5/9ths and that the unique min-max point is at the triangle's center of gravity. Note that existence and uniqueness of the min-max point extends to the entire class of concave population densities under consideration (see Demange (1982) ). The examples show that the min-max majority is connected to the degree of symmetry of the density, f(x). Indeed, this precise measure of symmetry was introduced by Winternitz in his study of convex sets (see Bonnesen and Fenchel (1934) ). This unexpected connection is important in the demonstration of our theorems. Note that in both half-spaces, x2 >0 and x2 < 0, wherever T and S' do not overlap, T lies above S'. Hence, the centroid of T lies on xl = 0 (by symmetry) above the origin. Thus the area of S' in the half-space x2> 0 exceeds the area of T above its centroid. From Proposition 3, the area lying above the centroid of T is 4/9ths. This contradicts the assumption that the area of S with x2 > 0 is less than 4/9ths.
To extend the two-dimensional result to n-dimensions is straightforward (see Grunbaum (1960) , Hammer (1960) ). The area on the smaller side of any hyperplane through the centroid of S is at least equal to the area above the centroid of an upward pointed n-dimensional cone. This area is (n/(n + l))fn.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 taken alone is of limited applicability. The assumption of a uniform distribution mandates perfect evenness within a set, falling to zero at the boundaries. It is important, therefore, to extend the results to less extreme cases.
Theorem 2 extends the bounds to general concave densities. However, unlike Theorem 1, the centroid no longer suffices to establish the necessary bound, as a simple example demonstrates. EXAMPLE 1: Consider a one-dimensional problem with a triangular density of voters' most preferred points, { f(x) = 2(1 -x), x E [0,1]). The centroid is at x = 1/3. Note that a point just to the left of x = 1/3 commands a 5/9ths majority against x. However, the median of the distribution, x = 1 -(2/2), commands at least a 50% vote against any alternative. With n = 1,1/2 and not 5/9ths is the desired bound on the min-max majority.
The problem arises because the centroid is calculated by weighting mass by distance, but distance appears to be an inessential feature of the problem. (Yet there is an interesting relationship between the min-max point and the centroid which is discussed in Comment 2 following Lemma 1 in the Appendix.)
Note that in Example 1, we get the two-dimensional bound for a one-dimensional problem. More generally, a concave density in n-dimensions gives rise to an (n + l)-dimensional convex set with uniform density, where the additional dimension represents the height of the density. This observation shows that the (n + l)-dimensional bound on m *(C) from Theorem 1 can still be applied to concave densities in n dimensions. But this is not the best bound available. Theorem 2 demonstrates that the bounds of Theorem 1 apply to general concave densities. With this construction, we have shown that x* is also the min-max point of a convex set with uniform density. Theorem 1 applies directly to show that the fraction of the area of U on any side of a hyperplane through x* is less than 1 -(n/(n + 1))n. Finally, according to (i) above, planes through x* divide the volume of U in the same proportions that they divide the population density in S, proving the theorem.
Theorem 2 provides a 50% bound for the one-dimensional problem, a 5/9ths bound or roughly 56% for two dimensions. The bound rises with dimension, converging to approximately 63.2%. Thus, the min-max point is a proposal supported by more than 36% of the population against any alternative. This point captures (n/(n + 1)) of the area in each of n dimensions. Correspondingly, the min-max majority equals (n/(n + 1))n for the n-dimensional solid simplex.
EXTENSIONS
The results of the last section are robust to various changes in the underlying assumptions. A1-A3 are taken up and relaxed in turn.
Al. Euclidean Preferences
Central to our results is a simple property possessed by Euclidean preferences: those who prefer proposal x to proposal y can be separated by a hyperplane from those who prefer y to x. With Euclidean preferences, this hyperplane is drawn in the space of most preferred points; it is the plane which perpendicularly bisects the line joining x and y. Individuals with most preferred points on one side prefer x, those on the other side prefer y, and those on the plane itself are equidistant between and thus indifferent between x and y. Grandmont (1978) 
A2. Concavity
Three relaxations of concavity are considered in turn. The results are first extended to functions close to concave. In this case, the limits on the min-max majority remain close to our previous bounds. More surprisingly, our results change dramatically when general quasi-concave densities are allowed. Finally, we consider finite populations drawn from a concave density. We show that as the sample population increases, the min-max majority converges almost surely to its nonatomic limit value.
To extend the bounds to functions close to concave, we use the L1 norm. This norm provides one possible measure of distance between two integrable functions, f(x) and g(x), defined on Rn, This example directly extends to higher dimensions. In R3, let (3/4)f(xl, x2) be applied to the bottom face of the unit cube with the remaining 1/4 mass spread uniformly over the entire cube. It is readily verified that m *(C) = 3/4. Generally, in n dimensions, (n/(n + 1)) of the previous density is applied to one (n -l)-dimensional face of the unit hypercube, and the remaining 1/(n + 1) mass is distributed uniformly over the hypercube. This generates an n-dimensional quasi-concave density function such that m *(C) = (n/(n + 1)).
Proposition 6 implies that the only dimension-free bound on the min-max majority for quasi-concave densities is 1, unanimity. Together with our earlier results, this shows that the restriction to concavity is increasingly important in higher dimensions. In one dimension, the bound is 1/2 for both the concave and the quasi-concave cases. In the plane, the bounds are 5/9 and 2/3 respectively, in R3, 37/64 and 3/4. The difference between these bounds grows monotonically with n from 0 to 0.11 to 0.17 to a limiting value of I/e.
The quasi-concave bound of (n/(n + 1)) in fact provides a universal upperbound. For any n-dimensional decision problem, m *(C) < (n/(n + 1)). With intermediate preferences, the universal nature of this bound follows from Lemma 1 in the Appendix. Even the restriction to intermediate preferences is unnecessary; the bounds of (n/(n + 1)) hold for arbitrary convex preferences (Greenberg (1979), Coughlin (1981)).
We now consider decision problems with a finite population. The most preferred points are independentlv drawn from a probability density f (x), where f(x) satisfies A2. In the limit as the population increases, the min-max majority converges to m * (C), its value for the limit decision problem.
The sample space is the set 02 of all infinite sequences of most preferred points x E S. A realization w E 02 involves the sequence of values (xl(X), .. ., Xk( ), ... ) where Xk((iO) represents the most preferred point for individual k in the given realization. Given w, consider the population consisting of the first k realized values, (xl(w),..., Xk(w)). Note that the min-max majority for this population is uniquely defined (this is the finite case originally studied by Simpson and Kramer) and is denoted by m *(w). Theorem 3, proven in the Appendix, confirms that with independent draws, the sample min-max majority converges almost surely to its limiting value. Hence, the bounds of the paper extend to large finite populations drawn from a concave density. 
A3. Inclusivity
Until now, we have assumed A3 (Inclusivity), that there is a continuum of alternative proposals. Inclusivity was used in the proof of Proposition 2 to approach interior points of S from all directions. In addition, inclusivity guarantees that the min-max point is a possible choice.
Yet, political decisions rarely involve more than a few alternatives. The restricted set of choices may not include the unrestricted min-max point, in which case our existing proofs break down. It is then important to show that all the results extend to cases in which X is finite, thus violating A3.
Proposition 7 demonstrates that the previous bounds on the min-max majority still apply provided only that the choice set, X, is compact. The proof uses the proposal in X closest to the unrestricted min-max point. 
CONDORCET ON VOTING
In this section, we suggest an interpretation of Condorcet's proposal for an electoral system immune to his paradox of voting. We show that this interpretation is closely related to the Simpson-Kramer min-max rule.
Condorcet argues that an electoral procedure should be based on pairwise comparison of proposals to avoid other paradoxes arising with plurality voting. He then demonstrates that majority votes in pairwise competition may lead to a "contradictory system". When this contradiction arises, Condorcet suggests that a vote decided by a large majority should take precedence over a vote decided by a small majority: a vote of 90: 10 counts for more than a vote of 51: 49. "The preceding reflections suggest this general rule: that whenever it is essential to make the election, it is necessary to take successively all the propositions that have a majority, beginning with those possessing the largest. As soon as these first propositions produce a result, it should be taken as the decision, without regard for the less probable decisions that follow" (Condorcet (1785, p. 56) Condorcet's rule is closely related to the Simpson-Kramer min-max rule. Both are based on giving priority to elections determined by the largest majorities. However, rather than using the largest majority elections directly to generate an ordering, the min-max rule uses these elections to eliminate losing propositions. The min-max point is then determined when all but one of the proposals are beaten. Returning to Example 2, B is beaten 75 to 25 and thus is eliminated first. Next, C is eliminated (with a vote of 65 to 35 against). Using a 60%-majority, only A remains as an undominated element.
In Example 2, both the Condorcet rule and the min-max rule lead to proposal A. Theorem 4 establishes that this equivalence holds more generally. In the proof, we show that the set of 8-majority winners is contained in a simplex with no more than e((n + 1)/n)n of the total population. This has the additional implication that for small e, all of the 8-majority winners are close together. Since all winning propositions are similar, the issue of which one is chosen becomes less significant.
The bounds of Theorem 5 may not be the best available, especially for decision problems in higher dimensions. In the present context, we are especially interested in the potential indeterminacy of a 64%-majority rule. Example 4 considers decision problems where a simple majority winner always exists, so that m *(C) = 0.5 and e = 0.14. For these examples we show that the indeterminacy of a 64%-majority rule shrinks rapidly with the dimension of the decision problem. The measure of indeterminacy falls from 28% with n = 1 to below 1% for n > 4. It may be judged that avoiding global cycles (and the resulting possibilities for agenda control) is more important than avoiding a small amount of indeterminacy. This suggests fixing the majority size above rather than below the average value of m *(C). Without Assumptions A1-A3, a unanimity rule may be needed to avoid electoral cycles (Greenberg (1979) ) leading to complete indeterminacy. The value of Theorem 2 is to provide a 64% bound on m *(C) applicable to a wide variety of problems. For any social decision problem satisfying Al-A3, a 64%-majority rule avoids electoral cycles and may lead to only minor indeterminacy. Define U to be the set which in each direction S away from 0 has length a,,I1b,I1. By construction, spherical integration shows that the mass in the half-space defined by any hyperplane through 0 is the same for the set S with density f(x) as for the set U with unit density.
LEMMA 3: The set U defined in Construction 1 is convex.
PROOF: Without loss of generality, take x* to be the origin. Consider two points b, and b2 on the boundary of set S. Since S is convex, the point xx = Xb1 + (1 -X)b2 is contained in S, for 0 6 X 6 1.
In the construction of the new set U, the ray joining 0 to b, is extended by factor a, and the ray joining 0 to b2 is extended by factor a2. No generality is lost setting a, = 1 and removing the subscript from a2, a = a2/al. To prove that U is convex it suffices that the expansion factor ax applicable to the line in S joining 0 and xx is large enough to extend the point Xx beyond the line connecting b, to ab2. By Lemma 4 below, this will be the case provided that ax satisfies inequality (5): 
mk(x*,7T,w) < max mk(X*-8Tj,Vj, w).
1<j<J
Since this inequality holds for all ir, Note that although we have restricted our attention to concave densities, this result applies more generally to continuous densities on full-dimensional compact supports. 
